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A LEAP INTO THE DARK? 
The Spending Review (2010:05) outlined how the then Coalition Government planned to 
reduce welfare costs and ‘wasteful spending’ through a radical reform of public services across 
England and Wales. Since 2010, we have witnessed significant changes to the design, delivery 
and commissioning of alcohol and drug treatment (to name just one sector) as the pursuit to 
demonstrate ‘value for money’ has become an overarching priority for front-line practitioners, 
commissioners and politicians alike. Although not a new concept, Payment by Results (PbR) 
has been utilised as a way in which increasingly scarce funding is allocated within and between 
such public services. Generally speaking, PbR is designed to pay service providers on the basis 
of the outcomes that they achieve rather than the activities that are undertaken (Department for 
International Development, 2014). It is a system of outcome-based commissioning, which 
transfers financial risk (or reward) to service providers. The idea behind PbR is that by 
commissioning outcomes rather than outputs, commissioners allow service providers to work 
in a way that they see fit, safe in the knowledge that if specific outcomes are not achieved, they 
do not have to make a payment (Webster, 2015). For some, PbR is considered to be a form of 
financial innovation with the potential to provide access to new capital and incentivise 
providers to develop innovative solutions to intractable social problems (National Audit Office, 
2015). For others, it is counterintuitive fiscal endeavour that stifles innovation and enhances 
accountability at the coal face of service delivery (Gosling, 2015; 2016).  
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In theory, the fundamental aim of PbR is to: improve service quality by offering bonuses to 
service providers for performance improvement or, withholding payments for poor 
performance; improve transparency around spending, by putting a tariff on service user needs; 
and ease pressure on public spending by staggering payments over longer periods of time 
(National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 2013). Despite such positive rhetoric, given 
the relative infancy of PbR (particularly in the alcohol and drug treatment sector) there is, in 
fact, a limited evidence based to draw robust, generalisable conclusions about whether this 
technically challenging form of contracting is an effective commissioning tool for public 
services (Audit Commission, 2012; Hunter and Breidenbah-roe, 2013; National Audit Office 
2015) that can perform better than other (more established) payment systems, in terms of 
money saved or improved outcomes (McNeil et al., 2015). Notwithstanding the uncertainty 
which surrounds PbR, it has become an increasingly common commissioning model across 
both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
THE CASE OF DELAWARE 
In America, up until 2002, Delaware's Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
(DSAMH) utilised cost-reimbursement contracts to fund alcohol and drug treatment services 
in the region. DSAMH licenses, monitors, funds, provides training and technical assistance, 
and oversees an array of services that include detoxification, outpatient, residential and 
methadone treatment programmes across the state of Delaware, United States of America 
(McLellan et al., 2008). Generally speaking, under a cost-reimbursement contract the final cost 
of service delivery is determined when the contract is complete, or at an established date in the 
contracting period. A total cost estimate is usually established, which allows a given service 
provider to set a budget for the task in hand. Cost-reimbursement contracts are usually 
implemented where the nature and/or scope of the work that is to be undertaken cannot be 
accurately and reliably defined at the outset. However, since 2002 cost-reimbursement 
contracts have been replaced with performance-based contracts which reward service providers 
who achieve specified outcomes. In Delaware, earned incentives are provided on a monthly 
basis, dependent upon three performance indicators: programme admission, participation and 
completion. DSAMH agree to pay one-twelfth of the total annual operating costs for each 
service at the end of every calendar month, contingent upon the service successfully 
maintaining an 80% utilization capacity rate. Utilization rates of 70-79% for the month 
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received 90% of full payment; 60-69% utilization received 70%; and utilization rates below 
60% received only 50% of the monthly payment (McLellan et al., 2008). 
 
McLellan et al., (2008) found that between 2001 and 2006 the average capacity utilisation went 
from 54% to 95%. Furthermore, the average number of service users meeting participation 
requirements increased, from 53% to 70%. Although this would suggest that performance-
based contracts have a positive effect on capacity utilisation, it is important to recognise that 
during this time many services began to streamline their admission procedures (reducing the 
data collection burden on practitioners); increase their hours of operation, making it easier for 
service users to attend early morning and evening classes; and three out of the eight 
programmes opened additional satellite offices to make the service more accessible in 
previously under-served areas. Thus, the changes that were made to the administration and 
delivery of alcohol and drug treatment during this time means that we are unable to eliminate 
the possibility that such initiatives were at least partly responsible for the increase in 
recruitment and engagement.  
 
It is also important to recognise that services did not provide additional opportunities (that may 
have been more aligned to an individual’s needs) for service users to gain different outcomes 
and/or experiences to those outlined and funded by the DSAMH. Rather, improvements were 
most rapid in respect of recruitment targets, which, perhaps coincidentally, also attracted the 
greatest amount of funding. Together these trends suggest that services primarily respond to 
financial incentives, putting in the greatest effort where the financial reward, as opposed to 
individual rewards, are greatest. Not necessarily seeking to excel in other ways (McLellan et 
al., 2008) or adopt innovative interventions that may be of more use to the individuals and what 
they need to help address their substance use. Subsequently, a potential side effect of 
performance-based contracts is the engendering of a mentality of doing just enough to gain 
financial rewards whereby the reward becomes the objective that is worked towards as opposed 
to service user progress (McLellan et al., 2008).  
 
THE CASE OF ENGLAND AND WALES 
On the other side of the Atlantic nearly a decade after performance-based contracts were 
introduced in Delaware, the then Coalition Governments 2010 Drugs Strategy outlined plans 
to introduce PbR to the drug and alcohol treatment sector in England and Wales (Her 
Majesty’s Government, 2010). In April 2011, after a bidding process which involved several 
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Drug and Alcohol Action Teams (DAATs) across England, the Department of Health 
announced that eight areas had been selected to pilot PbR over a two-year period: Bracknell 
Forest; Enfield; Kent; Lincolnshire; Oxfordshire; Stockport; Wakefield; and Wigan. The PbR 
pilot scheme aimed to aggregate existing funding streams, align overlapping services to 
increase available funds for providers and test the assumption that commissioning service 
providers on an outcome-focused basis would lead to improved efficiency as well as a 
transparent funding system based on the achievement of specified outcome measures 
(Department of Health, 2012). Although a generic PbR model was designed, each area went 
on to adapt and modify the proposed model. This meant that each model reflected the needs 
of the population engaged with services in the local area, the maturity of the local system of 
support and the different speeds at which each area was expected to achieve full 
implementation (Department of Health, 2012). In an attempt to create a degree of consistency 
across the areas, a co-design group which consisted of service representatives, central 
government departments and experts from the field, established a set of high-level outcome 
measures that spread across four domains. The four domains were: free from drug(s) of 
dependence; employment; offending; and health and well-being. The domain which covered 
employment was later removed before the PbR pilot scheme went live in April 2012 
(Department of Health, 2012). 
 
The Department of Health published a report which collates eleven months of data from the 
start of the pilot in April 2012, to the end of February 2013. As each pilot area utilised a 
different approach, the evaluators created a performance framework that ‘mirrors as closely 
as possible the outcomes that decided PbR payments’ (Department of Health, 2013:01). The 
framework consists of five outcome measures: abstinent from all presenting substances, 
successfully completed treatment free of dependency, resolved housing issues, stopped 
injecting and improved quality of life. All of which were employed to establish the effect PbR 
had on performance within the pilot areas, in comparison to the rest of the country. The 
evaluation not only sheds light on the complex nature of drug treatment but brings into sharp 
focus the nuanced ways in which ‘successful treatment outcomes’ are defined and measured 
with the findings suggesting that the performance of drug dependent clients (in terms of 
achieving abstinence from all presenting substances) was 5% higher than the national average, 
yet the overall performance of clients (in terms of successfully completing treatment free of 
dependency) was significantly below the rest of the county (Department of Health, 2013).  
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In May 2013, a national service provider’s summit was held in London to bring together 
representatives from the pilot areas to discuss their experiences of PbR over the first 12 
months. The findings suggest that there was a general consensus that PbR had been introduced 
too rapidly and as a result there was still a need to explain the initiative to the workforce and 
provide support for staff on how it worked. It was also recognized that PbR placed significant 
burdens on service providers, commissioners and service users, and data requirements to 
demonstrate outcomes and confirm payments were more onerous in pilot areas (DrugScope, 
2013). Similarly, the National Audit Office (2015) found that the reducing reoffending pilots 
(based in HMP Doncaster and HMP Peterborough) were also hampered due to comparable 
issues.  
 
Between 2010 and 2015, an intervention called the One Service provided through-the-gate 
and post-release support to adult males, released from HMP Peterborough, who had served a 
prison service of less than 12 months. The project sought to reduce reoffending amongst short 
term prisoners by providing a range of co-ordinated advice and support. It was intended to 
operate until 2017 (funded on a PbR basis) but was prematurely cut short due to the Coalition 
Government’s Transforming Rehabilitation agenda which introduced mandatory statutory 
supervision for short-term offenders – the initiatives intended target group. The pilot was 
operated by Social Finance, funded via a social impact bond, and operated by a partnership 
led by St. Giles Trust. The target was a reduction of 10% in the frequency of reconviction 
rates within each cohort of around 1000 prisoners (calculated by comparison with a match 
group). Findings from the first 18 months of the pilot suggest that for those released from 
Peterborough between July 2012 and December 2013 there were an average of 155 re-
conviction events per 100 offenders. A decrease of only 3% compared to an average of 160 
re-conviction events per 100 offenders released between July 2008 and December 2009.  
 
Although it has been more than six years since the concept of PbR was first introduced to the 
alcohol and drug treatment sector, and numerous practitioners (across a broad range of public 
services) have been subject to PbR-esque initiatives, there is a distinct lack of insight into the 
practitioners lived experience of such arrangements. For the purpose of this paper, a lived 
experience is defined as personal knowledge about the world gained through direct, first-hand 
involvement in everyday events rather than through representations constructed by other 
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people (Chandler and Munday, 2011). Rather than recognising and learning from the 
experience and knowledge of practitioners, conversations about outcome-based 
commissioning and its impact on practice have been dominated by academics and policy 
makers alike. Despite the fact that such lived experiences are able to inform, develop and 
refine high-level policy directives so that they are more in tune with, and respectful of, the 
realities of service provision. In an attempt to add a new dimension to this highly politicised 
debate, this paper will critically assess the impact of PbR on both the personal and professional 
lives of practitioners who currently work in a Therapeutic Community for substance use.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
The main aim of focus group research is to understand and explain the meanings, beliefs and 
cultures that influence the feelings, attitudes and behaviours of individuals (Powell et al., 1996; 
Rabiee, 2004). Compared to individual interviews, focus groups elicit a multiplicity of views 
and emotional processes within a group context (Gibbs, 1997). The interaction that can take 
place within a group setting also enables participants to ask questions of each other, as well as 
to re-evaluate and reconsider their own understandings of their specific experiences. Although 
focus group research has many advantages, as with all research methods there are limitations. 
The researcher (who is also typically the facilitator) has less control over the data that is 
produced than in either quantitative studies or individual interviews (Morgan, 1988; Gibbs, 
1997). This is because the role of the focus group researcher is to allow participants to talk to 
each other about the topic under investigation, ask questions and express doubts and opinions 
while having limited control over the interaction (Gibbs, 1997). By its nature, focus group 
research is limited in terms of its ability to generalise findings to a whole population, mainly 
because of the small numbers of people participating and the likelihood that the participants 
will not be a representative sample.   
 
In March 2016, the author facilitated a focus group with 11 drug and alcohol practitioners who 
currently work in a Therapeutic Community (TC) for substance use in the North of England. 
Generally speaking, the term Therapeutic Community, or TC as they are colloquially known, 
is used to describe a setting in which people with problems associated with substance use live 
together in an organised and structured way in order to promote change and make possible a 
life whereby they no longer rely on substances (Scott and Gosling, 2015). Each TC forms a 
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miniature society in which staff and service users, colloquially referred to as residents, are 
expected to fulfil distinctive roles that are designed to support the transitional processes that 
individuals embark upon during their residency. Although day-to-day activities and therapeutic 
interventions vary depending on the population and the setting of the programme, all TCs use 
a holistic ‘community-as-method’ (DeLeon, 2000) approach based on principles of self-help 
and mutual aid that emphasises the need to encourage constructive participation amongst all its 
members and engage with people’s problems whatever they may be.  
 
Focus group participants performed a variety of roles with varying responsibilities in the host 
TC. There were two admission officers, a manager, apprentice key worker and seven key 
workers who are directly responsible for overseeing residents care and progress during their 
time in treatment. All participants had extensive experience of PbR in the drug and alcohol 
field. Eight out of the eleven practitioners had experience of a PbR pilot scheme that took place 
in the host TC in 2011 (see Gosling, 2015 for further information about the PbR pilot scheme). 
Another had experience of working under PbR in a prison drug treatment programme 
(abstinence-based unit). One had previously worked for a drug and alcohol service where the 
Governments 2010 national recovery PbR pilot took place (see Department of Health, 2013 for 
further information), and another worked for an ex-offender mentoring service that attempted 
to introduce a voluntary PbR scheme. The focus group was based around three themes, which 
according to the Audit Commission (2012), typify what a PbR scheme should consist of. The 
areas include: improving outcomes or service quality, reduce costs or improve value for money 
and stimulate or transform change. The discussion lasted just under two hours, was recorded 
on a Dictaphone, transcribed and subject to content analysis.  
 
To open up the data, line by line coding was applied in an attempt to identify themes and key 
phrases. Creating a wide-ranging set of initial codes gives the researcher a road map to the data, 
allowing for further dissection of each data set while understanding the general ideas and 
concepts within the data (McGrain, 2010). The advantage of this type of coding scheme is two-
fold. First, starting with a list of general codes is a good way of providing the researcher with 
something to work with; and the creation of additional codes means that the coding can become 
limitless, allowing the researcher to get everything that they can from the data. The next coding 
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phase, which is referred to as here focused coding, is considered to be more abstract than line 
by line coding as it helps to verify the adequacy of the initial concepts developed (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990). As phrases and key words were identified, broad labels which described the 
content of each passage were recorded. Broad themes were then coded and sorted into a more 
specific theme. In total, the analytical strategy produced three broad themes: competiting 
commitments, accountability and manageralism.  Each of which are critically reflected upon 
in the next section. Although such methodological and analytical strategies are able to provide 
a rich detailed insight into how people make sense of and respond to their setting and social 
world, given the small sample size, qualitative nature of the study and subjective nature of the 
findings, the generalizability of this study is somewhat limited. Despite the methodological 
limitations which surround this study, providing an opportunity for practitioners to have their 
voice heard is particularly timely given the lack of discussion between commissioners and 
service providers at all stages of the PbR design and implementation process (Lagarde et al., 
2013). 
 
PBR: A WOLF IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING? 
Although PbR is becoming an increasingly common commissioning model across the public 
sector, one of the most consistent shortcomings of the incentive is the inherent disparity 
between its proclaimed aspirations and the actualities which surround its design and delivery 
(Gosling, 2015; 2016). It has been claimed (on a predominately political level) that outcome-
based commissioning is a method for improving outcomes, yet in practice, PbR merely 
provides an alternative, more stringent, way to pay for the same service (Hunter and 
Breidenbach-Roe, 2013). Additionally, it is also alleged that PbR encourages innovation and 
creativity amongst practitioners to do ‘what works,’ yet the very nature of the incentive means 
that it is impossible to (re)secure a contract without substantive evidence of effectiveness. 
Furthermore, as PbR heightens the use of target / outcome driven practices, attempts to be 
innovative and creative are diluted as meeting contractual obligations and specified outcomes 
are prioritised.  
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An ‘implementation gap’ – whereby a set of policies exist on paper but are absent on the ground 
- is particularly apparent in the alcohol and drug treatment sector as high-level policy directives, 
such as PbR, are increasingly championed as a vehicle that will steer ongoing strategies for 
reform, despite the initiatives abject failure to recognise and appreciate the context (and indeed 
contested nature) of recovery. The respective, incremental nature of recovery from substance 
use is widely documented (White, 2004). As are the complexities which surround defining 
what the term actually means (The Betty Ford Institute Consensus Panel, 2007), what it consists 
of (abstinence, maintenance and/or moderate substance use), and more recently, what recovery 
‘looks like’ (Best et al., 2015). Although the term recovery is widely used, particularly within 
and around the health care sector, the lack of a standard definition has hindered public 
understanding of the process and research within and around the area (The Betty Ford Institute 
Consensus Panel, 2007). Although existing research in and around abstinence-based treatment 
services, such as the TC, have produced a robust body of knowledge that has contributed to the 
creation of empirically-informed theoretical models (DeLeon, 2000) and explicit methods by 
which service users have become abstinent from substances of choice (Borkman et al., 1998; 
De Leon, 2000; Flynn et al., 2003) there are currently no reliable, standardised measures of 
recovery or prevailing concepts which typify what the term actually means (The Betty Ford 
Institute Consensus Panel, 2007).  
 
Although precise definitions of recovery are lacking, broad themes which outline what 
constitutes as recovery - on a political level - are clear. Some of the most troubled individuals 
are expected to ‘move-on from their problem drug use towards a drug-free life and become an 
active and contributing member of society’ (The Scottish Government, 2008: VI). As a result 
of these political themes, PbR in its most basic form, expects service providers to evidence how 
they have helped service users to achieve a series of pre-determined key performance indicators, 
colloquially referred to as ‘outcome’ measures, which demonstrate (albeit on paper) that 
individuals are free from dependency and ‘contributing’ to society within a relatively short 
space of time. The aforementioned themes are not only aspirational, but based upon a political 
desire for alcohol and drug treatment services to support service users towards some kind of 
‘fixed state,’ characterised by a series of ‘outcome’ measures that can be bought and sold within 
an increasingly competitive market. Attempts to commission alcohol and drug treatment 
services based upon an architype version of recovery that gives precedent to the creation of a 
marketable version of recovery as opposed to a meaningful individual-centric recovery 
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experience is counterproductive, ill thought through and detached from the realities of service 
provision and more importantly, the multi-faceted nature of individual change. Rather than 
creating a mode of commissioning that complements existing service provision, PbR 
introduces competing commitments to the sector, imposing series of socio-political key 
performance indicators upon service providers and service users alike.  
 
As past history shows it is so difficult to define a positive outcome. They are specific 
to services and to each individual for that matter because every single person has 
different individual needs. You can use care plans and risk management plans to 
identify what their support needs are but it’s so hard to define from one individual to 
the next. But what they [commissioners] want is a set way to do things and I just don’t 
think it works.  
(Participant 1) 
 
Recovery from substance use is an ongoing journey of improvements rather than an 
accomplished state (McLellan, 2010; Best and Lubman, 2012), yet PbR sets out a clear mission 
to standardise service delivery through a series of all-encompassing ‘outcome’ measures. 
Although key performance indicators (such as those adopted by the Governments PbR recovery 
pilot in 2012) are legitimate concerns for the sector, they are not necessarily a conclusive nor 
definitive indicator of recovery, best practice or indeed value for money (Gosling, 2015). 
Standardised performance indicators may be financially valuable to an organisation, given that 
they are able to generate an income, but they are by no means able to accurately capture the 
realities of recovery or ‘what works’ at the coal face of service delivery. This is due to the fact 
that the notion of value for money and effective practice have a fundamentally different ethos; 
one focused upon saving money, the other on saving people. Value for money, according to 
the National Audit Office, is fundamentally about ‘spending less’, minimising the cost of 
resources used or required to achieve intended outcomes (National Audit Office, 2016). 
Whereas discussions about effective practice in the alcohol and drug treatment field tend to 
focus upon the value, and subsequent impact, of the therapeutic alliance between practitioners 
and service users (Meier et al., 2005) as well as a client’s readiness, motivation and 
commitment to change (DeLeon, 2000).  
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Rather than complementing existing practices and providing a genuine way in which already 
stretched services can demonstrate value for money, PbR fuels one of the fundamental and 
arguably most longstanding controversies which surround the drug and alcohol treatment 
sector; how to define and measure recovery from substance use. Rather than introducing an 
initiative that is grounded in genuine understanding and foresight, we are witnessing the 
emergence of a policy that has been introduced to ensure services, that are already 
overstretched and under resourced, are working towards the creation of a product (service users 
who ‘achieve’ a series of socio-political key performance indicators, disguised as ‘outcome’ 
measures) that has considerable financial value within a competitive consumer market. The 
marketization of recovery not only converts a highly-person journey into a neo-liberal activity, 
characterised by competition, economics and inequality, but transforms the alcohol and drug 
treatment sector into a recovery free-market, whereby services compete for work (and service 
users) with the promise to perform (achieve specified outcomes) for the cheapest amount of 
financial investment.  
 
Mulgan et al., (2010) suggest that PbR is a key accountability mechanism for the Government 
as they are only committed to pay for services that are able to produce evidenced results. The 
emphasis that is placed upon the production and dissemination of ‘evidence’ – as a way in 
which to demonstrate who has the best product on the market – re-iterates how neo-liberal 
ideals are able to further penetrate the sector under the guise of PbR. More broadly, despite 
claims that outcome-based commissioning will help to unlock ‘professionalism’ and place 
‘trust’ in the hands of front-line practitioners (Ministry of Justice, 2013), PbR continues to 
deconstruct professionalism at the coal face of service delivery; eroding flexibility and 
individual autonomy. Rather than unlocking professionalism, PbR stifles innovation and 
creativity as practitioners have a series of key performance indicators to work towards in 
addition to their daily duties.  
 
The biggest impact that this has is on the quality of work that you can provide because 
it isn’t so much about them [service users]. It was all about that set specific work that 
you have to do to ensure that we got paid.  
(Participant 4) 
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The degree to which meaningful, individualised relationships between practitioners and service 
users can exist and thrive within a financially-driven landscape is subsequently questionable. 
Although in a different context, Annison et al., (2014) suggest that humanistic and personalised 
approaches are in direct conflict with new and emerging practices (such as PbR) that are 
competitive and profit driven. The discussion presented here illustrates how the 
commodification of recovery transforms the role and responsibilities of all those involved in 
the alcohol and drug treatment sector. Service users are transformed into fiscal subjects that 
can be bought and sold within an increasingly competitive market (Author, 2016). Practitioners 
are transformed from facilitators of recovery to an administrators of recovery; charged with 
evidencing the creation and production of a marketable version of recovery that has a financial 
value rather than humanitarian value; and services / organisations adopt a role that is more in 
line with a brokerage firm; doing little more than facilitating the buying and selling of products 
to the market for a profit.  
 
My phrase to sum this up is that it becomes like a cattle farm; get them in, get them out as 
quickly as possible. The mentality become that as soon as a client got to that point of a 
positive outcome get them discharged and that’s when overdoses and all kinds started 
happening because they literally finished their detox, were discharged from treatment 
because of that positive outcome and three days later they were dead.  
(Participant 1)  
 
It doesn’t matter how passionate you are, how caring or how much you want the best for 
your clients, that person centred approach then gets lost because your too busy focusing on 
a business model in the back of your head. You just think I’ve got to do this work to make 
sure that we get this money so we can remain in jobs. You just lose the essence of what we 
do and it doesn’t matter whether it is residential, prison or community. It has the same 
impact right across the board.  
(Participant 2) 
 
Transforming practitioners into administrators of recovery, working within a financial rather 
than person-orientated framework whereby service users become ‘passive recipients of care’ 
(Ryan et al., 2012:2) provides an opportunity for the State and private investors alike to literally 
and figuratively call to account those who are required to meet the standards and contractual 
obligations of PbR. Although a number of practitioners spoke about the official disciplinary 
procedures which surrounded one’s failure to meet PbR objectives, the majority of the 
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discussion during the focus group focused upon the idea that practitioners adopted a sense of 
fear, internal pressure and self-blame if they were unable to achieve given outcomes.  
 
I saw that many staff go off with stress and depression because of the amount of pressure 
that they were put under. 
(Participant 5) 
 
 
Payment by Results is designed to ensure that certain outcomes are being achieved and 
with that comes a lot of stress and a lot of negativity. It becomes a negative environment to 
work in. I actually worked in a service that was pretty much a guinea pig for the country 
back in 2010. It created a very difficult working environment, staff were being pressured 
by management for outcomes and management were being pressured by commissioners.  
(Participant 1) 
 
PbR creates a clear dichotomy between what practitioners feel they should be doing in order to 
‘do a good job’ and what they were expected to do in order to ‘get things done.’ This tension 
is further compounded as practitioners develop a morally ambiguous relationship with PbR. 
On one hand it was recognised that PbR may be a way in which services could survive within 
an increasingly competitive field. Whereas on the other hand, it was felt that PbR could force 
practitioners and service providers alike to conduct ‘ability audits’ of potential clients before 
engaging with them to establish whether they are able to achieve specified key performance 
indicators and associated funding. So much so that a number of practitioners began to critically 
reflection upon their experience of PbR in light of the demands of the initiative.  
 
We’re only gonna go for the fruit that’s hanging on the lower branches anyone higher up 
the tree with more complex needs could end up an addict for life.  
(Participant 6)  
 
That’s a fair point because I had a case load of 74 and I would park the bus with those who 
were on large amounts of medications: 90mls, 100mls of Methadone; Benzos; all that kind 
of stuff. They just got left. I don’t mean literally left. It was a case of here’s your script, 
how are you doing, write out a sheet to say that they had been in and that was it. I was more 
focused on the people that were obviously able to achieve those positive outcomes. Not 
everyone gets the same type of care and support that they should because there is pressure. 
(Participant 1) 
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It’s promoting us to look at the needs of those that aren’t considered to be complex cases. 
So if you have had a chaotic life and underlying needs that have never been met, it is going 
to take that little bit more time to develop you, but we can’t do it because we haven’t got 
the time and we don’t want to take a gamble because there might not be a payment there. 
(Participant 6) 
 
The auditing of potential clients provides a way in which practitioners and service providers 
alike can identify financial assets (those able to achieve specified outcome measures) and locate 
those who are considered to be a ‘gamble’ or particularly ‘risky.’ This subsequently enables 
practitioners to consciously locate and divide their time, energy and resources amongst service 
users; with those deemed to be a financial asset attracting the most investment from 
practitioners given the anticipated fiscal return. The implementation of high-level policy 
directives, such as PbR, creates a series of micro-practices that holds the ability to change the 
professional climate and ethos of service delivery as humanity, dignity and intrinsic worth of 
individuals are replaced with neo-liberal principles and prescriptions. Introducing a series of 
bureaucratic, financially driven processes that focus upon the documentation of a standardised 
version of recovery removes practitioners further from the coal face of service delivery and in 
some instances, encourages practitioners to take a more ‘proactive approach’ to their profession.  
 
I was probably one of the most consistent workers in terms of meeting targets because I 
took a very proactive approach. I was going in at 7 in the morning and getting home at 9 at 
night which had a big impact on my personal life.  
(Participant 1) 
 
The above quotation illustrates how the tensions and dilemmas which surround PbR had an 
impact upon both the professional and working lives of practitioners. During the focus group, 
many practitioners felt that their ability to maintain a healthy work-life balance was 
undermined as they, although not asked to do so, were spending an increasing amount of time 
in the work place in an attempt to meet the needs and demands of PbR as well as their clients. 
The competing commitments and increased sense of accountability which descended over 
practitioners, as PbR was introduced, had a longstanding impact on how practitioners, involved 
in the aforementioned focus group, define their role within the sector as they prepare for the 
next policy directive which attempts or provide ‘value for money’.  
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CONCLUSION 
The findings that are presented here are original and bring something new to the discussion 
about PbR in the public sector, particularly for services in and around the alcohol and drug 
treatment field. The discussion highlights some of the competing commitments and 
contradictions that arise as PbR is implemented at the coal face of service delivery. Notably 
the neo-liberal (re)construction of welfare-orientated practices into a market-driven activity. 
The marketization of an individual’s alcohol and/or drug treatment experience contributes to 
broader debates about the privatisation of public services, in particular the viability of 
broadening, extending and diversifying agents who, under outcome based commissioning, can 
financially punish service providers, as the state becomes further decentralised. The idea that 
private companies in and around the Criminal Justice System ‘profit from punishment’ has 
been discussed elsewhere (Prison Reform Trust, 2005) but the notion that profit can be made 
from alcohol and/or drug treatment is yet to be highlighted and critically discussed. In light of 
the findings presented within this paper, it is possible to suggest that PbR (particularly in the 
alcohol and drug treatment sector) introduces a more discrete way in which the Government, 
commissioners and/or private investors alike, can regulate and control (in one form or another) 
an individuals’ access to, and experience of, alcohol and/or drug treatment, through a nuanced 
socio-economic system of micro-governance that is able to punish services and service users 
alike who are unwilling and/or unable to meet specified goals and key performance indicators 
of said political, social and economic authorities.  
 
The aforementioned socio-economic system of micro-governance is legitimised through PbR. 
As practitioners at the coal face of service delivery and service users alike, are becoming 
increasingly held to account for a task (in this instance, the recovery process) which requires 
social support and equal opportunities for all members of society. Putting outcome-based 
commissioning mantras at the forefront of the political agenda distracts attention away from 
the social pressures and differential opportunities that exist between people and communities, 
which prevents individuals from accessing help and support in the first instance. Rather than 
tackling the nuanced issues which surround social equality and available treatment 
opportunities, PbR schemes are targeted at intractable multi-faceted social problems with the 
hope that an outcome focused approach will somehow solve longstanding individual and social 
issues.  
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PbR is undoubtedly a growing mode of commissioning in and around the United Kingdom 
with private probation contracts, a large proportion of new contracts in the homeless and 
alcohol and drug treatment sector all containing an element of PbR, with income dependent on 
reaching specified outcome targets (Webster, 2015). Although the findings that are presented 
here are not generalizable to all practitioners’ experience of PbR, the discussion has the 
capacity to contribute to broader social and criminal justice policy debates about the increasing 
marketization of the management and supervision of public services, particularly those that 
work alongside individuals trapped in a vicious cycle of substance use, criminal activity, 
punishment and marginalisation. The paper also provides a significant contribution to ongoing 
discussions in and around the marketization of the welfare state more broadly. Whitfield (2015) 
suggests that PbR and current trends in social investment is primarily driven by financial 
institutions whose motivation is to privatise the welfare state and open up new markets for 
global corporations. The findings that are presented here support this point, illustrating how 
the reconfiguration, decentralisation and marketization of public services within and around 
the alcohol and/or drug treatment sector (for example) demonstrates a firm commitment to 
market, financial and economic values rather than welfare / humanistic values. Putting financial 
profit before people; forcing services to attribute ‘value’ to what they are asked to measure – 
through initiatives such as PbR – rather than measure what they and their service users consider 
to be valuable.  
 
Bibliography  
Annison, J., Burke. L., and Senior, P. (2014) ‘Transforming Rehabilitation: Another Example 
of English ‘Exceptionalism’ or a Blueprint for the Rest of Europe?’ European Journal 
of Probation. 6 Pp. 6 – 23.  
 
Audit Commission (2012) Local payment by results. London: Audit Commission.  
 
Best, D., Albertson, K., Irving, J., Lightowlers, C., Mama-Rudd, A., and Chaggar, A. (2015). 
The UK Life in Recovery Survey 2015: the first national UK survey of addiction 
recovery experiences. Project Report. Sheffield, Helena Kennedy Centre for 
International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University. Available on-line at: 
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/12200/ [accessed on 19.07.2016]. 
 
Best, D. and Lubman, D. (2012). The Recovery Paradigm. A Model of Hope and Change for 
Alcohol and Drug Addiction. Australian Family Physician. 41(8). Pp. 593-597. 
 
18 
 
Borman, T., Kaskutas, L., Room, J., and Ma, L. (1998) An historical and developmental 
analysis of social model programs. Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment. 27 Pp. 123-
134. 
 
Chandler, D. and Munday, R (2016) A Dictionary of Media and Communication. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. Pp. 256. 
 
Community Links (2015) The troubled families programme: the perfect social policy? Centre 
for better outcomes. London: Collaborate at London South Bank University.  
 
DeLeon, G. (2000). The Therapeutic Community. Theory, Model and Method. New York: 
Springer. 
 
Department for International Development (2014) Payment by Results Strategy. Sharpening 
Incentives to Perform. Available on-line at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfids-strategy-for-payment-by-results-
sharpening-incentives-to-perform/payment-by-results-strategy-sharpening-incentives-
to-perform [accessed on 19.07.2016]  
 
Department of Health. (2012). Equality Analysis: Payment by Results Pilot Programme for 
Drug and Alcohol Recovery. Available on-line at:   
www.gpcwm.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/PAYMENT%20BY%RESULTS%20(PBR)P
ayment_By_Results_Pilot_Programme_for_Drug_&_Alcohol_Recovery_Equality_A
nalysis_Aug_2012.pdf [accessed 21.07.2013]. 
 
Department of Health. (2013). Improving Outcomes and Supporting Transparency. Part 1: A 
Public Health Outcomes Framework for England 2013-2016. Available on-line at: 
http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/pdf/The%20Public%20Health%20Outcomes%20Framewor
k.pdf [accessed on 04.12.2013]. 
 
DrugScope. (2013). The Public Health Reforms. What They Mean For Drug and Alcohol 
Services. Available on-line at : 
http://www.drugscope.org.uk/Resources/Drugscope/Documents/PDF/Policy/PublicHe
althReform.pdf [accessed 04.12.2013]. 
 
Flynn, P. M., Joe, G. W., Broome, K. M., and Simpson, D. D. (2003) Looking back on cocaine 
dependence: Reasons for recovery. American Journal on Addictions 12 Pp. 398 - 411 
 
Gibbs, A. (1997) Focus Groups. Social Research Update. Issue 19. Available on-line at: 
http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU19.html [accessed on 19.07.2016] 
 
Gosling, H. (2015) An invitation to change? An ethnographic study of a residential Therapeutic 
Community for substance use. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Liverpool John Moores 
University 
 
Gosling, H. (2016) ‘All this is about is money and making sure that heads are on beds.’ 
Perceptions of Payment by Results in a Therapeutic Community. Probation Journal. 
The Journal of Community and Criminal Justice. 63 (2) Pp. 144 – 152. Available on-
line at: http://prb.sagepub.com/content/63/2/144?etoc  
 
19 
 
Her Majesty’s Government. (2010b). Reducing Demand, Restricting Supply, Building 
Recovery: Supporting People to Live a Drug Free Life. Available on-line at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/98026/
drug-strategy-2010.pdf [accessed 28.11.2013]. 
 
Her Majesty’s Treasury (2010) Spending Review. Available on-line at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/203826
/Spending_review_2010.pdf [accessed on 19.07.2016] 
 
Hunter, D., and Breidenbach-Roe, R. (2013) Payment by Results contracts: a legal analysis of 
terms and processes. London: BWB/NCVO 
 
Lagarde, M., Wright, M., Nossiter, J. and Mays, N. (2013) Challenges of payment for 
performance in health care and other public services – design, implementation and 
evaluation. London: Policy Research Unit in Policy Innovation Research  
 
McLellan, A., Kemp, J., Brooks, A. and Carise, D. (2008) Improving public addiction treatment 
through performance contracting: The Delaware experiment. Health Policy. 87. Pp. 296 
– 308. 
 
McNeil, C., and Hunter, J. (2015) Breaking boundaries: towards a troubled lives’ programe for 
people facing multiple and complex neds. London: Institute for Public Policy Research  
 
McGrain, P. (2010). An Examination of Therapeutic Engagement. An Examination of 
Therapeutic Engagement in a Prison-Based Drug Treatment Therapeutic Community. 
Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing. 
 
McLellan, T. (2010). What is Recovery? Revisiting the Betty Ford Institute Consensus Panel 
Definition. Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment. 38(2). Pp. 200–201. 
 
Meier, P. S., Barrowclough, C., and Donmall, M. C. (2005) The role of the therapeutic alliance 
in the treatment of substance misuse: a critical review of the literature. Addiction. 100 
(3) Pp. 304 - 316 
 
Ministry of Justice (2013) Transforming Rehabilitation. A Strategy for Reform. Available on-
line at: https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/transforming-
rehabilitation/results/transforming-rehabilitation-response.pdf [accessed on 
28.12.2015]  
 
Morgan D., L. (1988) Focus groups as qualitative research. London: Sage. 
 
Mulgan, G., Reeder, N., Aylott, M. and Bo’sher, L. (2010). Social Impact Investment: The 
Challenge and Opportunity of Social Impact Bonds. London: The Young Foundation. 
 
National Audit Office (2015) Outcome-based payment schemes: government’s use of payment 
by results. Available on-line at: https://www.nao.org.uk/press-releases/outcome-based-
payment-schemes-governments-use-of-payment-by-results-2/ [accessed on 31.07.2015] 
 
20 
 
National Audit Office (2016) Assessing Value for Money. Available on-line at: 
https://www.nao.org.uk/successful-commissioning/general-principles/value-for-
money/assessing-value-for-money/ [accessed on 20.07.2016] 
 
National Council for Voluntary Organisations. (2013). Payment by Results (Public Services). 
Available on-line at: www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/commissioning/paymentbyresults 
[accessed 04.07.2013]. 
 
Policy Exchange (2013) Expanding Payment-by-Results. Strategic choices and 
recommendations. London: Policy Exchange.  
 
Powell R.  A., Single H.M., Lloyd K. R. (1996) ‘Focus groups in mental health research: 
enhancing the validity of user and provider questionnaires’, International Journal of 
Social Psychology 42 (3) Pp. 193 - 206. 
 
Prison Reform Trust (2005) Private Punishment. Who Profits? Available on-line at: 
http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/portals/0/documents/private%20punishment%20
who%20profits.pdf [accessed on 19.07.2016] 
 
Rabiee, F. (2004). Focus-group interview and data analysis. Proceedings of the Nutrition 
Society, 63. Pp. 655 - 660.  
 
Ryan, P., Ramon, S., Greacen T., (2012), “Introduction” In Ryan, Ramon & Greacen (eds.), 
Empowerment, lifelong learning and recovery in mental health: towards a new 
paradigm. Basingstoke: MacMillan. Pp.1-12. 
 
Scott, D. and Gosling, H. (2015) Before Prison, Instead of Prison, Better than Prison: 
Therapeutic Communities as an abolitionist real utopia. International Journal of Crime, 
Justice and Social Democracy. 5 (1). 
 
Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of Qualitative Research. London: Sage. 
 
The Betty Ford Institute Consensus Panel. (2007). What is Recovery? A Working Definition 
From The Betty Ford Institute. Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment. 33. Pp. 221–
228. 
 
The Scottish Government (2008) The Road to Recovery. A New Approach for Tackling 
Scotland’s Drug Problem. Available on-line at:  
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/224480/0060586.pdf [accessed on 20.07.2016] 
 
Webster, R. (2015) Payment by Results: Lessons from the Literature. Available on-line at: 
http://russellwebster.com/documents/Lessons%20from%20the%20Payment%20by%2
0Results%20literature%20Russell%20Webster%202016.pdf [accessed on 20.07.2016]  
 
White, W. (2004) Transformational Change and Addiction Recovery. Counselor. 5. (4) Pp. 30- 
32 
 
Whitfield, D. (2015) Alternatives to private finance of the welfare state: the global analysis of 
social impact bonds, pay-for-success and development impact bond projects. Adelaide: 
21 
 
Australian Workplace Innovation and Social Research Centre and European Services 
Strategy Unit 
 
 
